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Abstract: Semiotics is the theory par excellence of the artificial and therefore should 
have a substantial role in understanding designed phenomena. By tracing the 
relation between design and semiotics at the level of the distinction between the 
analytic and the synthetic (or artificial), this paper argues that semiotics struggles to 
explain the environmental element of design so central to post-artefactual accounts 
of design. The analytic method of semiology is suitable for understanding existent 
semiotic structures but less so at modeling alternate signifying systems—or systems 
that alter, transform and self-interpret, that is, environments. The paper argues 
that to understand such milieus a turn to the aesthetic is necessary. By aesthetics it 
is meant the simultaneous mapping of the environment, the articulation of the 
environment and the counterfactual element of any design process. More 
particularly the paper will focus on recent developments within social semiotics to 
argue that such a framework must move beyond the constraints of analytical spatial 
and visual grammar to take into account not only multimodal texts but planning, 
systems and services. It will conclude by arguing that ultimately design and 
aesthetics are the same phenomenon, not in the sense that design is the study and 
application of aesthetic principles to useful objects or experiences, but in the sense 
that it is the organization of the counterfactual elements of artificial—designed—
environments. 
 
Keywords: Design, Aesthetics, Semiotics, Artificial environments, 
Counterfactual communication 
1. Introduction 
Semiotics has always been the premier “science” of the artificial—after all, the sign is only ever 
meant to stand in for something else (aliquid stat pro aliquo), even if it is another sign. The sign is not 




myth is constituted when the artificial nature of the sign, its ever-tenuous link to the object, is 
forgotten and taken as “natural” (1972). Any theory of the sign is therefore a theory of constructed 
meaning—of designed meaning. Furthermore, the fundamental principle of most linguistics, 
particularly structuralist linguistics, is that signs constitute an artificial system that can be studied 
autonomously. That system or structure can be said to contain its own laws and its own logic 
independent of any particular context of embodiment or use (langue over parole). Whatever the 
case, the semiotic approach to the study of communication, that is, to organised meaning-making, 
has had a profound influence on design methodology and pedagogy. This influence includes the 
semiotic, information theory and cybernetic-based theory at Ulm of Max Bill, Max Bense, Tomás 
Maldonado, Horst Rittel and Abraham Moles (Lindinger 1991), the pedagogical (and political) 
alternatives to the Beaux-Art approach in, particularly, France and Italy in the late 1960s and early 
70s, product semantics and indeed “post-semiotic” design semantics (Klaus Krippendorff, 2006). In 
turn, within the discipline of semiology designed phenomena have held a special place of analysis, 
corresponding with the broadening of the structuralist project beyond purely linguistic and textual 
phenomena. For example, there is Umberto Eco’s longstanding relation with architecture and 
urbanism (1972), Roland Barthes’ studies of fashion (1985) and Jean Baudrillard’s analysis of the 
“system” of objects (1996). There is Jean-Marie Floch’s “industrial semiotics” (2000), Anne Beyaert-
Geslin’s work on semiotics, design and aesthetics (2012), Kress and van Leeuwen’s studies of the 
“grammar” of visual culture (1996) and, more recently, the increasing acknowledgement of spatial 
design and the built environment within social semiotics and multimodal discourse analysis (van 
Leeuwen 2005, Ravelli and McMurtrie, 2016). If design is a signifying practice, common to all 
semiotic-based design theory is the search for a language, or at least a grammar, of design. 
The scientific status, however, of any such language is contentious. Science investigates and 
describes “what is” (nature in its broadest sense), and the form of its logic is propositional and its 
methodology analytical. But at least since the argument offered in Herbert Simon’s Sciences of the 
Artificial (1996 [1969]) the epistemological domain in which design is located, the artificial, is that of 
the emergent, of “what will be” and to a certain extent of “what ought to be”. “Everyone”, he 
famously stated, who “designs… devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into 
preferred ones” (p. 111). Differently put: understanding the grammar of a designed object or 
experience must always be done in tandem with how that object or experience may be altered; how 
it can be re-designed, reformulated, or begun anew. This is quite different from other forms of 
knowledge and inquiry. To understand design—the creation and communication of the artificial—is 
not just to understand representation(s) and their associated meanings but planning, invention, 
mapping, prototyping, etc., that is, all forms of disegno. Design creates models of the to-be as much 
as it attempts to model the existent. Unlike scientific discovery, design research intentionally aims to 
alter the status quo and therefore all design has an element of the counterfactual to its language. 
Furthermore and crucial to our argument the field of design research today is environmental, that is, 
at its most basic level, circumstantial and interactive not artefactual. This contextual dimension, as 
we shall see, has been difficult for traditional semiotic theory to grasp. 
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2. Semiotics and design 
2.1 Objectivist and constructivist, analytic and synthetic approaches 
to meaning in design 
To organise the brief history of the relation between design and semiotics, I would like to consider a 
distinction that Klaus Krippendorff employs to, in fact, criticise the semiotic approach to design—
“objectivism” and “constructivism” (1992, and reformulated in Krippendorff 2006). The distinction 
more or less maps on to what we have begun to distinguish between the analytic and synthetic; even 
between science and design according to Simon. Conventional semiotics for Krippendorff is 
objectivist, that is, it attempts to describe a reality that ultimately stands outside the process of its 
description. In objectivism, categories of thought are devised to accurately as possible describe the 
phenomena under observation and the central category of semiotics, the sign, Krippendorff believes, 
demonstrates this conviction that reality “possesses observer- or culture- independent structures, 
objects, codes and laws waiting to be discovered, enciphered and described” (1992, p. 25). This 
discovery and description is necessarily analytic; it divides, labels and catalogues. He also claims the 
“laws” of semiotics are thought to be ultimately independent of context and of any particular 
application; for example, in the case of syntax, the rules governing relations between signs are often 
sought in formal languages—mathematics and geometry in particular—which do not provide a place 
for “creators, users or observers” (p. 27). In this vision of semiotics, there is a tendency to 
standardisation, an inherent dualism (material sign and immaterial concept) and, at worst, an 
intellectual imperialism (p. 29). Constructivism, on the other hand, finds reality neither outside the 
observer, nor solely and solipsistically “inside”. Rather, there is a co-authorship, a “circular process of 
perception and action or of conceiving and making things” (p. 25). Though Krippendorff does not 
explicitly use the term, the constructivist notion of meaning making and therefore of signification is 
environmental. Meaning arises for constructivism not through the connection between a sign and a 
referent (or non-connection as the case may be), but through participation, that is, social practice. 
This practice, Krippendorff argues, is a form of understanding, by which he means not the application 
of categories or principles to phenomena to determine whether they match or not, but the ongoing, 
recursive process of constructing a relationship with the world (p. 33). The “semantic turn”, as he 
calls it, is the “awareness that the human world is created by human involvement” and not by a 
foreign “world of signs” (2006, p. 275). While we will later question the humanism of this claim, the 
charge that classical semiotics is overly analytical is worth pursuing especially as it has a bearing on 
whether the discipline can support a thinking of environments (rather than structures). Nevertheless, 
to briefly preface our investigation: analytics in design has always occupied a privileged place. The 
basic units of design have been able to be isolated and then arranged, whether they be the units of 
colour systems or the grid(s) of graphic design, or the basic forms of building in the modular dream 
of modernism, or the pattern language of, say, Christopher Alexander (1977). But what of the 
resultant synthesis? What of composites whose parts interact, adapt and alter in ways not explained 
by reverse engineering (e.g., systems, services, planning)? These are environments in which the flow 
of communication and information are essential and by nature multi-modal. Moreover, such 






2.2 Analytic structuralism: Barthes and Eco on urban design 
In his paper of 1967, “Semiology and Urbanism”, Roland Barthes reminds us that all (human) space is 
and always has been “signifying space” (p. 191). The ancient notion of habitat, the oekoumène, for 
example, was thoroughly semantic and based on structuring oppositions (hot and cold, known and 
unknown, men [sic] and monsters, etc.). This is quite different, he argues, from contemporary 
cartographic thinking that represents urban space by exactitude of position (what something is, is 
where it is located), which, according to Barthes, is akin to a form of “censorship”. For Barthes, the 
relation between centre and periphery, for example, is an active structural principle of differentiation 
that enables signification (meaning) and therefore precedes “urban distribution based on functions 
and usage” (p. 192). In 1967, he sees little evidence that urbanists are addressing this key constituent 
of signification, with the exception perhaps of urban planner Kevin Lynch (1960); but, Barthes argues, 
identifying the elements of the city—“paths, enclosures, districts, intersections, points of reference”, 
etc.—does not necessarily make them semantic. While semiology too is first and foremost 
analytical—it breaks signifying phenomena into units and then groups those units into classes—it 
goes further, determining rules of combination and transformation of those units in order to identify 
meaningful and meaning-generating patterns and events (p. 196). Lynch’s elements are ultimately 
lexical rather than grammatical, more “gestaltist than structural” (193). Otherwise phrased, there is 
significant discord between “objective geography” and signification: two parts of a city may be 
geographically bound (they may “intersect”) but they may also signify radically different urban 
experiences so that, on the plane of signification, they are not linked at all. The lexical gives a 
glossary for the city but not a syntax. “The city”, Barthes instead claims, “is a discourse, and this 
discourse is actually a language: the city speaks to its inhabitants, we speak our city, the city where 
we are, simply by inhabiting it, by traversing it, by looking at it” (p. 195).  
Though Barthes recognises the need for semiology to account for the synthetic nature of the city he 
struggles to find a way to articulate it. He admits that the units of componential analysis used to 
describe phenomena may always prove elusive—for semiotics, the signified slips from under the 
signifier, and so the relationship between material expression and the concept is ever fluctuating, 
never fixed. He attempts to locate the synthetic element—the “sentence” that is the city—in what 
he calls the erotic dimension of the urban. By erotic he means the encounter with the stranger that 
the city constantly and by definition offers up, and which he describes as a form of reading (p. 201). 
Alongside its distribution of functions, the city is also a libidinal and textual system; or, rather, 
libidinal because textual. Here Barthes is attempting to overcome the more analytical aspect of a 
structural approach with an idea of interaction, in this case, the encounter. 
In his essay published in 1972 edition of Semiotica, “A Componential Analysis of the Architectural 
sign /column/”, Umberto Eco also initially investigates an analytical approach to the semiological 
units that compose architectural artefacts. Any architectural element is a process of signification 
rather than simple stimulation (a step responded to by raising a foot); for example, /staircase/ 
consists of the articulation of a few morphemes recognised as a “machine for ascending”. But the 
same set of morphemes may not actually be used as stairs, therefore Eco argues that the 
“communicative aspect predominates over the functional aspect, and precedes it” (p. 213). The 
architectural unit or object is a sign before it is an object. Nonetheless, he maintains the distinction 
between primary functions (denotation) and secondary functions (connotation) is still relevant to 
architectural study, as long as the term function is not taken too literally. Indeed Eco points to an 
“aesthetic fallacy” which separates building—functionality—from architecture—“aesthetic auto-
reflectiveness” (p. 215); by the latter he means the tendency to privilege the “poetic function” 
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(Jakobson) as the primary language of architecture (p. 219). Eco makes the basic point that any semic 
feature of an architectural, spatial language is realised in a morphological feature. His analysis of the 
semic feature /column/ is thus: 
 
Figure 1. Umberto Eco, A componential analysis of the sign /column/, Semiotica 1972 
 
Eco indicates that this componential process is potentially endless, or at least every semic analysis 
“must continually return to the problem of semantically defining its own instruments” (p. 232). Here 
at least is recognition of the recursive nature of the artificial: that is, the incessant feedback loop 
between the morphological and semantic levels (between the plane of expression and the plane of 
content). Componential analysis operates well enough when reading existent architectural texts or 
units like a column but it is much less comfortable putting those units back together or 
understanding those units as a dynamic whole. Eco admits as much; the last words of the article 
declare, “… if and how the system is to be constructed has yet to be demonstrated”, where by 
system it is meant the organisation of the sememes, this unlimited process of semiosis. But it is not 
only the artefact or the unit (the –eme) that is to be semiotically decoded. If design is also counter-
factual, then the operations of planning and the creation of schemata for future creation and future 
use must also be taken into account. A core trait of design is the mapping of the existent to alter 
what is, and therefore the mapping of the yet-to-exist (this is the role of the imagination in design, 
see Folkmann, 2013). This “echo chamber”—this movement, alternation and vibration between verb 
and noun-form, active and passive, genesis and structure, etc.,—is difficult to grasp conceptually and, 
it appears, semiotically. This is because the field design describes and intervenes in—the artificial—is 






2.3 Social semiotics and design 
Social semiotics is based in systemic functional linguistics (Halliday, 1978) and includes multimodal 
discourse analysis, that is, the theory and practice of scrutinising the meanings that evolve out of the 
use of multiple semiotic resources in texts (or textual aggregates: discourses), whether print, visual, 
electronic, sonic or spatial, etc. It also investigates “cross-functional systems” such as colour. The 
primary purpose of social semiotics, as the name suggests, is to understand the use of signifying 
systems. Social semiotics professes to focus less on the infrastructural properties of such systems 
(their “laws”) as on the deployment and modification of those systems by the participant. Social 
semiotics is therefore constructivist in Krippendorff’s terms rather than objectivist. Indeed the field 
prefers the idea of “resource” to that of sign as its central category. Resource emphasises the act of 
selection from a given range of meaning making “tools” to communicate, while “sign” tends to be 
overly formal and asocial (van Leeuwen 2005, p. xi). Dominant in media and communication studies, 
and though it addresses both spatial and visual communication, the approach, however, has not 
focused explicitly on design. 
Social semiotics identifies three levels, or metafunctions, of meaning in any complex text: 
representational, interactional, and organisational. Representational meaning is what something is 
about, interactional meaning is the range of social, affective connotations, and the organisational is 
the manner in which meaning is derived by the configuration of phenomena (different arrangements 
of the same pieces of furniture, for example, may indicate a class is to be held or an interview will be 
taking place) (Ravelli and McMurtrie 2016). Design maps onto, or can be mapped by, each level: 
iconographic or indexical meanings that the symbolic language of graphics employ 
(representational); interior design that creates moods, ambiences, or hierarchies (interactional), and 
systemic meanings generated by configurations of information, for example, way-finding, 
diagraming, and assemblages (organisational). This last metafunction also, crucially, is intended to 
take into account that something can be rearranged, and therefore meaning can be altered; that is, it 
is a function to understand configuration and synthesis. 
In particular, visual communication studies and media studies have been well served by the social 
semiotic, systemic functional linguistic approach. Not only does the image “naturally” lend itself to 
semiotic analysis—every image seems to stand in for something else regardless of its actual level of 
iconic verisimilitude—images are relatively static texts, or at least the layout of text and image is 
relatively stable. For example in any newspaper, magazine or internet page, the left in terms of 
reading practice will appear as the “given”, the pre-existent, and anything materialising to the right 
will appear as “new” (difference to the given therefore always emerges as sequential, implying a 
narrative). The upper area of a layout will be the realm of the “ideal”, the lower section, the “real”, a 
zoning corresponding to and activated by deeply embedded cultural practices of reading vertical or 
perpendicular space (this would accord with Krippendorff’s quasi Chomsky-esque notion of 
“understanding”). Interestingly, if not problematically, social semiotics effectively reverses the 
semiological order—the idea or concept, e.g. the “ideal”, far from being constantly displaced in 
relation to the signifier is always realised in a material choice or selection. Placing text or an image in 
the top zone of a layout, for example, will have radically different “meaning” to placing it in the lower 
half. This choice or selection is crucial to the participatory dimension of meaning generation in social 
semiotics, even if the range from which the selection is made is finite and indeed systematised.  
In many respects social semiotics seems to respond to both the broader criticism leveled at 
semiology by Krippendorff—that its categories ultimately exist outside the participation required to 
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make meaning and the understanding required to use and design artefacts—and the limitations we 
have seen in structural semiology: the struggle to embrace the synthetic nature of discursive 
structures and, moreover, the notion of design as generating alternatives to what is given. 
Nonetheless, the componential approach still governs social semiotics. Any mode or text to be 
investigated is initially handled analytically: after research, an inventory of resources—the individual 
items that can be selected to make meaning—is drawn up (van Leeuwen 2005, p. 6f). These 
inventories ultimately form a “system network” characterised by either-or choices or both-and 
choices at each “level”. For example in formalising the notion of framing—the relative 
“disconnection of the elements of a visual composition” (p. 7)—in the context of magazine 




Figure 2. Theo van Leeuwen, system network diagram: framing, from Introducing Social Semiotics 2005 
 
Beyond the visual, the same cataloguing process can be made of, say, spatial phenomena: 
 
Figure 3. Theo van Leeuwen, system network diagram: spatial framing, from Introducing Social Semiotics 2005 
 
Such inventories point to the fact that the units of semiological analysis are not atomistic; they are 
“bivalent”. Further, they are not static but directional. Nonetheless, and as is clear in the 
diagramming, there is little indication of recursion, feedback, or even misreading (misdirection). 
Without this notion of recursion or environmental interaction it is very difficult for social semiotics to 




multimodality (the latter is conceived as an aggregate composition of modes, rather than a new 
state), and therefore to account for the full breadth of the designed, that is, of the artificial. For 
example, what of services and service design that rely on the full participation of its users to be 
“realised”, and often in ways completely without prediction, that is, counterfactually, or at least in 
ways which divert from a scheme of selection? More importantly still, what of milieus that modify 
themselves, that are composed of non-human agencies? Much contemporary design, especially 
architectural, spatial and urban design, is now essentially this form of environmental design (for a 
history see Anker 2010): those environments are once spatial, informational, temporal and recursive. 
Furthermore, as the concept of “framing”, for instance, is realised by a chosen semiotic resource, we 
have an odd Platonism reappearing—Krippendorff’s “two worlds” that haunt the semiotic project—
insofar as the material element becomes an instantiation of the conceptual element, a kind of 
inverted indexicality, or at least an inverted referential structure. What is more, a materialist or 
material studies view might easily reverse the polarity, as it were: instead of separation being 
realised by “empty space, furniture arrangements, etc.” (p. 16), the experience or understanding of 
empty space may have engendered the more abstract, cultural notion of “separation”. 
3. From ecology to environment: the artificial 
The analytical methodology inherent in semiology has struggled with conceptualising environments. 
As we have seen Krippendorff identifies two approaches to the study of designed phenomena, the 
“objectivist” and the “constructivist”. The former is constrained by a “two-worlds” ontology while 
the latter is practice-orientated, that is, meaning is created through interaction defined by 
evolutionary understanding, rather than by logically equating ideas with representations. While 
taking into account the theoretical accuracy of this criticism of the ontology of semiotics (its inherent 
Cartesianism), the notion of design semantics transpiring predominately through understanding is 
also problematic, first and foremost because an environment is not constituted solely by or through 
human activity. Environments self-organise. They regulate and transform according to the processing 
of (new) information, and the social practices within them—or constituting them—are part of this 
“process”. Environments are at once technical, biological and communicational. In the Semantic 
Turn, Krippendorff, who studied under the cybernetician W. Ross Ashby, does in fact offer an account 
of an ecological approach to artefacts. But that ecology is only activated by human use: the “crucial 
difference between ecologies of biological species and of artifacts: Biological species interact on their 
own terms; artifacts interact on human terms” (2006, p. 195). So opposed to the dualist metaphysics 
inherent in semiology, Krippendorff reconstitutes it here as the relative autonomy of nature and 
human activity. Yet far from an issue of deconstructive subtlety, it is the very fact that the two 
spheres, for good or ill, are now so merged they must be understood by the broader concept of the 
“artificial” (Fry, Dilnot, Stewart, 2015)—such too is the presumption of the concept of the 
“Anthropocene” (see Turpin 2013). No two-world theory works anymore because there are no 
longer two distinct worlds to theorise. 
4. The aesthetic turn 
To date, Beyaert-Geslin’s studies notwithstanding, aesthetics has had a limited role in semiotics and 
indeed in social semiotics. Rather than being associated with concrete meaning, it describes the 
domain of taste, sensibility, or personal predilection. Thus the aesthetic appears as either utterly 
parole-like—part of the moment and indeed arbitrariness of the individual choice from a broader 
language (say individual items of clothing selected from the language or grammar of costume, 
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Barthes 1967, pp. 26-27)—or utterly langue-like, as the autonomous system of colour relations, for 
example, or the formal relations between spatial typology (Ching, 2007), the range of textures, or 
sets of sounds, etc., that is, a non-user system in Krippendorff’s terms. 
Nonetheless, it seems to me that aesthetics is the discourse which may be the most adequate for the 
conceptualisation of the artificial precisely because it has never been a discourse strictly devoted to 
analysis (nor then to generating concepts which simply categorise phenomena); but, rather, one 
devoted to articulation. Aesthetics explores relations between things, how they are organised, how 
they “fit”, how they materially converse. The aesthetic is also the domain in which concepts are 
experimented with, worked out, turned inside out and exposed to the counterfactual. Aesthetic 
activity is the process of counterfactual “communication”. In terms of design studies, or designing, 
this is the point where art and design intersect—not in the produced artifact about which statements 
can be made about relative beauty or value (though this may occur), but in the propositional space, 
so to speak, of the model, that is, the space in which the future of the artifact, service or experience 
has not been fully actualised. The model is first and foremost a “resource” for experimentation, 
dispute, and reorganization, not a prototype for scaling up and building. To employ another social 
semiotic term, the aesthetic—or aesthetic “thinking”—is aligned with the “organisational” 
metafunction. This means not just how an actual interior is arranged, for example, but its possible 
arrangement. Aesthetic thinking, aesthetic research, is the “redesign of design” (un redessin du 
dessin), and art takes the form of a “metadiscourse of design” (un métadiscours du design) (Beyaert-
Geslin 2012, p. 15). 
5. Conclusion 
If classical semiotics excludes human agency (or understanding) and is overly componential; if social 
semiotics is abridged by its reliance on system networks without response (e.g. feedback); and if 
human-centred design semantics understates the essential non-human elements of an environment, 
is there a discourse capable of understanding the artificial (and, indeed, is it a question of 
“understanding”)? As Simon surmised, a science of the artificial is required which takes into account 
the alteration of the status quo as essential to its epistemology, but as we have seen perhaps it is not 
a new science of the artificial that is vital but rather an aesthetics of the artificial. What is clear at 
least is that the two fields may now no longer be separated in any meaningful way because: 
1. The distinction between artificial and natural is no longer effective, 
2. The observer and observed are environmentally imbricated,  
3. The counterfactual occurs at least simultaneously to the factual (the factum: the 
made); the “to-be” precedes the real, as it were; and so, 
4. There is only an open series of models, not a closed referential system between 
model and real. 
When it comes radically artificial environments—those effectively “un-analysable”—the science of 
the artificial merges with aesthetics of the artificial. Not explicitly named in Simon’s characterisation 
of the artificial—synthetic, imitative, adaptive, and imperative (p. 5)—aesthetic discourse 
encapsulates those definitions, while also modeling and figuring the hidden dimensions of our 
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